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Abstract
In this chapter, I argue that we have good reason for being realist
about quantum states. Though a research programme of attempting
to construct a plausible theory that accounts for quantum phenomena
without ontic quantum states is well-motivated, that research pro-
gramme is confronted by considerable obstacles. Two theorems are
considered that place restrictions on a theory of that sort: a theorem
due to Barrett, Cavalcanti, Lal, and Maroney, and an extension, by
the author, of the Pusey Barrett Rudolph theorem, that employs an
assumption weaker than their Cartesian Product Assumption. These
theorems have assumptions, of course. If there were powerful evidence
against the conclusion that quantum states correspond to something
in physical reality, it might be reasonable to reject these assumptions.
But the situation we find ourselves in is the opposite: there is no
evidence at all supporting irrealism about quantum states.
1 Introduction
There is a long tradition, very much alive in the present day, of irre-
alism about quantum states—that is, of denying that quantum states
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represent anything in physical reality.1
In this chapter, I will argue that the grounds we have for tak-
ing quantum states to represent physical properties of the systems to
which they are ascribed are as strong as the grounds we have for tak-
ing atoms or electromagnetic waves to be real and to have something
like the properties we ascribe to them. I will take it for granted that
we do, indeed, have sufficient grounds for belief in the reality of atoms
and electromagnetic waves. It is not my intention to try convince a
committed scientific anti-realist to make an exception for quantum
states. The issue at hand is orthogonal to the age-old struggle be-
tween scientific realists and anti-realists. My targets here are those
who deny that quantum states represent anything in physical reality
from a standpoint that holds that one can, indeed, under certain cir-
cumstances ascribe reality to entities that are not directly observable,
but take it that there are reasons specific to the quantum context for
denying ontological import to quantum states.
The question of the representational status of quantum states is a
question that can be addressed even though we know that quantum
mechanics is not a fundamental theory, but rather, a non-relativistic,
low-energy approximation to a quantum field theory, and even though
we have good reason to believe that even our best quantum field the-
ories are effective theories, low-energy approximations to some deeper
theory that would incorporate gravitation. Electromagnetic fields are
real, even though classical electromagnetic theory is an approxima-
1This tradition goes back at least as far as Bohr and Einstein, who agreed that quantum
mechanics should not be taken as descriptive of physical reality, though they disagreed
on the propriety of seeking a theory that would be. For Bohr, all description of physical
reality had to be couched in classical terms, and the limits of classical physics were the
limits of physical description. Einstein argued, in several places (see, e.2g., Einstein 1936),
that quantum states should be regarded as akin to the probability distributions of classical
statistical mechanics, that is, as representing incomplete knowledge of some deeper un-
derlying physical state. Contemporary representatives of this tradition include those who
call themselves QBists (formerly “Quantum Bayesians”) (Caves et al., 2002; Fuchs et al.,
2014; Fuchs and Schack, 2015). The central tenet of QBism is that a quantum state assign-
ment is nothing more than a way of encoding an agent’s subjective degrees of belief about
that agent’s own future experiences. Views that take quantum states to be representations
of a state of knowledge, rather than physical reality, are often called ψ-epistemic views.
A prominent exponent of an epistemic view of quantum states is Rob Spekkens (2007;
2012). Richard Healey(2012; 2017a; 2017c; 2020) advocates a pragmatic view of quantum
states, which denies that quantum states are representational. See Healey (2017b) for an
overview of views of this sort.
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tion, valid within a limited regime, to a more fundamental theory.
Classical physicists had good reason to believe that any deeper theory
would include electromagnetic fields in its ontology, even if these fields
are not precisely as classical electromagnetic theory conceives them to
be. A successful argument that quantum states are real would not be
one that depended crucially on a fiction that quantum mechanics is
exactly right. What is required is an argument that we can expect
any theory that recovers the predictions of quantum mechanics, or
at least a close approximation to them, within the known domain of
applicability of quantum mechanics, to have something corresponding
to quantum states in its ontology, either as fundamental ontology or
emergent from something more fundamental. As we shall see, this im-
poses a non-trivial constraint, as it would not do to take as a premise of
the argument some condition that is violated by quantum field theory.
In section 3 we will examine some theorems that circumscribe the
realm of possible physical theories that can account for quantum phe-
nomena. The first to be considered is the result of Barrett, Caval-
canti, Lal, and Maroney (2014), which shows that quantum states
cannot be construed as some have hoped they could be, as probability
distributions over an underlying state space, in such a way that op-
erational indistinguishability of quantum states can be accounted for
in terms of overlap of the corresponding probability distributions. We
will then consider the theorem of Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (2012),
which demonstrates, on the basis of an assumption about independent
preparations performed on distinct systems, known as the Preparation
Independence Postulate (PIP), that distinct pure quantum states are
ontologically distinct.2
In accordance with the requirement that the ontological lessons we
draw from physical theory rely only on premises that can reasonably
be expected to be preserved under the transition to a successor theory,
we should ask whether the PIP passes muster in that respect. And,
indeed, there is an aspect of it that is problematic, in light of quantum
field theory. The Postulate assumes that, for a system consisting of
two or more spatially separated subsystems, for appropriate prepara-
tions the resulting state of the whole can be regarded as consisting
merely of a list of states of the component subsystems. This assump-
tion is called the Cartesian Product Assumption (CPA). This holds
in classical physics, but is violated in any theory that is realist about
2In labelling the Preparation Independence Postulate and its relatives, we follow the
terminology of Leifer (2014).
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quantum states. It holds within a fragment of quantum mechanics in
which the states prepared are product states (that is, in which there
is no entanglement between the spatially separated parts). However,
quantum field theory gives us incentive to doubt whether product
states can reliably be prepared (see Clifton and Halvorson 2001).
This gives us motivation to formulate a substitute for the PIP that
does not invoke or presuppose the CPA. In section 4, I present a con-
dition that holds whenever the PIP holds but which is strictly weaker
than it, which I call the Preparation Uninformativeness Condition
(PUC). This condition requires no assumption about the structure of
the state space of composite systems or its relation to subsystem state
spaces. On the basis of the assumption of this condition, it can be
shown that distinct quantum states—as long as they aren’t too close
together—must be ontologically distinct.
All of these theorems are couched within the ontological models
framework. This framework, explicitly formulated by Harrigan and Spekkens
(2010), codifies reasoning implicit in the practice of information the-
ory, quantum or otherwise, and, indeed, in much of science and every-
day life. Aspects of the framework could be rejected, but, as the sort
of reasoning invoked is implicit in so much of science, strong grounds
would be required for doing so. Now, it is, of course, possible that
the methods of inference that we routinely employ in other domains
of science lead us astray when it comes to investigating the quantum
domain. One thing that is, after all, uncontroversially true is that any
realist construal of quantum mechanics entails rejection of some one or
other tenet of classical physics that one might have otherwise thought
could be taken for granted. I acknowledge this, and, indeed, I accept
that, if we had strong evidence that these methods of inference lead us
astray when applied to the quantum domain, it would be reasonable
to reject them. What is not reasonable, and not consistent with an
earnest investigation of the world around us, is to reject methods of
inference simply because their application would lead to conclusions
that one finds unpalatable. The claim I am advancing in this chapter
is that we do not have grounds for doubting the conclusion that quan-
tum states represent something in physical reality that are sufficient
to undermine the premises and modes of reasoning that lead to that
conclusion.
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2 Arguments for anti-realism about quan-
tum states
First, let us look at some of the reasons that have been given for deny-
ing that quantum states represent something physically real. There
are two ways that one could take these. One could take them as
motivating pursuit of a project of trying to develop a theory in whose
ontology quantum states do not appear. Another way would be to take
them as arguments for the conclusion that quantum states do not rep-
resent anything physically real. The difference matters, because the
criteria for success of the arguments are different, depending on what
the conclusion is taken to be. Upon undertaking a research project,
say, to attempt to find a theory of a certain sort, one does not require
assurance that the project can reach its goal. All that is needed is that
it appears to be a promising line of research, whose goal, if reached,
would constitute an advancement in understanding. Moreover, un-
successful attempts themselves may lead to deeper understanding, if
they help us to understand why they were unsuccessful—especially if
we learn that the goal could not be reached.
If, on the other hand, we had strong evidence for the conclusion
that quantum states are not representational, then, faced with argu-
ments, such as those to be considered later, that they are, this evidence
might afford us reason to be suspicious of, and perhaps even reject, the
premises that lead to the conclusion. I do not think we are in such a
position. The sorts of arguments that are given for anti-realism about
quantum states serve their purpose well if they are taken to provide
motivation for a certain line of theory pursuit. If, however, one were
to take them as providing evidence for the conclusion that quantum
states do not represent anything physically real, the evidence provided
is weak at best, and certainly not sufficient to cast doubt on mundane
assumptions that otherwise would be accepted without question.
In my opinion, the project of constructing an empirically adequate
physical theory whose ontology would dispense with quantum states
was, indeed, a worthwhile and well-motivated project, and, moreover,
one that has been fruitful, precisely because it has led to deeper in-
sight into the obstacles that such an endeavour faces. The situation
bears some resemblance to the question of the viability of local hidden-
variables theories. Inspired by the EPR argument for the incomplete-
ness of quantum mechanics, J. S. Bell (1966) raised the question of
whether there could be a hidden-variables theory that did not share
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the nonlocality of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, noting that, as far as
he knew, there was “no proof that any hidden variable account of
quantum mechanics must have this extraordinary character.” What
happened was that the quest for a local hidden-variables theory led
to an impossibility proof. Bell’s proof rests on assumptions, as any
proof must. One of these is the so-called “no-conspiracy” assumption,
namely, that it is possible to create an experimental set-up in which
the instrumental settings are effectively independent of the prepared
state of the system to be experimented upon. One can, without logical
contradiction, reject this assumption. But a rejection of this sort is a
blunt instrument; it could be used to reject any experimental conclu-
sion one doesn’t like. The relevant question is: in the case of the Bell
experiments, do we have evidence of conspiracies of this sort? If the
answer is simply that they are being invoked to avoid an unwelcome
conclusion, then it seems not unfair to say that those who invoke them
have abandoned the sincere quest for knowledge about the world.
Leifer (2014) has helpfully compiled some of the chief arguments
that have been advanced in favour of rejecting realism about quan-
tum states. Leifer regards these as sufficiently strong that a reader
who appreciates their force should find the ψ-ontology theorems sur-
prising.3 As already mentioned, I think that these considerations are
better thought of as providing motivation for a project of constructing
a theory that does not include quantum states in its ontology, rather
than as positive evidence for the unreality of quantum states.
The first argument Leifer considers stems from the Rob Spekkens’
toy theory (Spekkens, 2007). With a remarkably simple construction,
Spekkens demonstrates that a number of phenomena that we might
have thought of as distinctively quantum can be captured by a model
that is essentially classical, with restrictions on state preparation and
on access to information about the state of the system. An elementary
system in this toy theory is a set of four boxes with a ball that can
be in one of them. The preparable states of individual systems are
restricted in such a way that the most one could know is that the ball
is in one of two of the boxes, with equal probability for each. For a
pair of elementary systems, in addition to the product states, there
3“ψ-ontology,” with pun intended, is a term that has gained currency among physicists
who discuss these matters for views that hold that quantum states represent something
in physical reality. It is attributed to Christopher Granade, who was a student in Rob
Spekkens’ quantum foundations course at Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics in
2010 (see Leifer 2014, p. 71).
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are also entangled states, in which, for each of the subsystems, the
ball is equally likely to be in each of the boxes, but there is perfect
correlation between the two systems.
Features of quantum theory that are reproduced in the toy theory
include existence of pure states that cannot reliably be distinguished,
no-cloning, and (an analogue of) interference. Quantum phenomena
that are provably not reproduced in the toy theory include violations
of Bell inequalities, and the possibility of obtaining a Kochen-Specker
obstruction.4 It is suggested that the quantum-like phenomena that
the toy theory reproduces are evidence that quantum theory itself is
a theory of the type instantiated by the toy theory, that is, a theory
with an essentially classical state space and a restriction on possible
state preparations. An alternative moral that could be drawn is that
it was a mistake to think of those phenomena as distinctively quan-
tum (Myrvold, 2010, p. 182); such phenomena are, at most, weakly
nonclassical (Spekkens, 2016, p. 92).
Support for this latter moral is found in work on generalized prob-
abilistic theories. The framework of generalized probabilistic theories
encompasses a wide variety of different sorts of probabilistic theories.5
The scope of this framework is wide enough to include classical prob-
abilistic theories, with or without restrictions on state preparations,
quantum theories, and, in addition, a whole host of theories neither
classical nor quantum. The theory whose state space consists of the
states allowed in Spekkens toy theory and probabilistic mixtures of
these states falls within the scope of this framework.
Within the class of generalized probabilistic theories, there is a
distinguished class, those with a state space that is a simplex, mean-
ing: any mixture has a unique decomposition into pure states. These
theories are the classical theories with no restrictions on state prepa-
ration. Call these fully classical theories, to distinguish them from
classical theories with preparation restrictions, which exhibit some
features usually thought of as non-classical. Theories that are not
fully classical have in common the feature of having pure states that
are not distinguishable.6 Ipso facto they have all of the consequences
of that condition, such as no-cloning. It is no surprise that quantum
theory, being one of the theories that are not fully classical, shares
with the Spekkens toy theory the features that are shared by all the-
4If this term is unfamilier to you, see Held (2018) for background.
5See Janotta and Hinrichsen (2014) for an introduction and overview.
6Provided that the theory’s state space is the convex hull of its set of pure states.
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ories that are not fully classical. This is no reason to think that there
should be some commonality in the physical interpretation of all such
theories.
Leifer suggests that the fact that quantum theory falls within this
broad framework, which also includes classical probability models, is
evidence for an epistemic view of quantum states. “In this theory,
quantum states are playing the same role in the quantum case that
probability measures play in the classical case, and so it is natural
to interpret quantum states and classical probabilities as the same
kind of entity” (Leifer, 2014, p. 76). Thinking along these lines, it
seems to me, fails to do justice to the generalized probabilistic theories
framework. The framework was constructed to embrace a wide range
of theories, and arguably what it presumes is just the minimum one
would expect of any physical theory. It is completely neutral as to
the physical interpretation of the states of the theory, and in this
neutrality is its strength, as it is the source of generality.
The second argument considered by Leifer concerns fragments of
quantum theory that can be recovered in a classical model. For in-
stance, under suitable restrictions on quantum state preparations and
evolutions, the Wigner function, a function on classical state space
definable in terms of the quantum state, is positive and acts like a
density function for a probability distribution over a classical phase
space.
Is this surprising, on the assumption that quantum states are real?
I think not. Suppose that you had never heard of quantum theory, but
had become convinced that classical physics is inadequate in certain
ways, because its predictions in certain domains are incorrect. You
would, quite reasonably, expect any successor theory to recover the
successes of classical physics. This means that you would expect to ob-
tain something like classical behaviour in the relevant domains, or, to
put it another way, that there be fragments of the theory that exhibit
classical or quasi-classical behaviour. Studies of the classical limit of
quantum mechanics take positivity of the Wigner function as an indi-
cation of classicality. That quantum mechanics exhibits classical-like
behaviour in certain domains—that is, that quantum theory has a
quasi-classical limit—is not evidence that quantum states are unreal,
but, rather, a precondition for taking quantum mechanics as a serious
candidate for a comprehensive theory.
Leifer also takes, as a strength of the epistemic view of quantum
states, the fact that it bypasses the notorious quantum state collapse.
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Certainly, it is an attractive idea, one that has no doubt occurred to
many, that collapse of the quantum state be thought of as nothing
more than updating of information upon learning the result of a mea-
surement. The question is whether this can be made to work. Any ap-
proach to the so-called “measurement problem,” including one that de-
nies that quantum states represent physical reality, owes us an account
of what happens in an experiment. The mainstream approaches—
hidden-variables theories, dynamical collapse theories, and Everettian
interpretations—all provide such accounts. Each of these deals with
collapse in different ways. On the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory,
collapse of the effective wave function is a demonstrable consequence of
the theory. On dynamical collapse theories, collapse is a real physical
process. And Everettian theories can explain why, under appropriate
circumstances, agents may be justified in disregarding other branches
of the wave function other than their own, just as if there had been
collapse. There is yet no worked-out proposal for a theory that em-
braces quantum phenomena on which quantum states are epistemic.
At best we have is a hope that an account of what happens during an
experiment could be given on which quantum states play no part in
the ontology. The situation, then, is that all of the main avenues of
approach have rejected the problematic textbook version of collapse,
with its reliance on a distinction between “measurements” and other
physical processes, and have provided a unified account of the goings-
on of physical systems that makes no use of this distinction at the
fundamental level and which nevertheless gives an account of why the
textbook formulation works as a heuristic. In each case, this is accom-
plished by taking the quantum state as part of the ontology. Against
this, the ψ-epistemicist offers only a hope that it could be accom-
plished without ontic quantum states. As long as this hope remains
unfulfilled, consideration of the issues surrounding the measurement
problem remain a problem to be solved by, rather than evidence in
favour of, a ψ-epistemic view.
To sum up: if there were powerful evidence against the conclu-
sion that quantum states correspond to something in physical reality,
it might be reasonable to question the assumptions behind the argu-
ments, to be considered in the next section, for the reality of quantum
states. But the situation we find ourselves in seems to be the opposite;
there is no evidence at all supporting irrealism about quantum states.
At best we have considerations that suggest the pursuit-worthiness of
the project of attempting to construct a plausible theory that accounts
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for quantum phenomena without ontic quantum states.
3 Arguments for an ontic construal of
quantum states
The arguments for ψ-ontology will be framed against the background
of the ontological models framework. We will introduce this frame-
work, then consider some arguments for ψ-ontology. The conclusions
will differ in strength, depending on the strength of the auxiliary as-
sumptions involved. We will first consider the theorem of Barrett,
Cavalcanti, Lal, and Maroney (2014), which shows that indistinguisha-
bility of quantum states cannot be fully accounted for by overlap
of probability distributions over an ontic state space. We will then
consider the theorem of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (2012), and
then a variant of it that replaces the key assumption of this theo-
rem, the Preparation Independence Postulate, with a weaker assump-
tion, which we will call the Preparation Uninformativeness Condition
(PUC).
3.1 The ontological models framework
Consider the following set-up, the sort of scenario with which infor-
mation theory, be it quantum or classical, routinely deals. Alice has a
message that she wants to convey to Bob. She has a physical system
that she can send to him, after subjecting it to one of some set of
available preparation procedures. Alice and Bob have an agreed-upon
coding that associates possible messages with the available prepara-
tion procedures. Alice chooses her preparation procedure, subjects
the system to it, and sends it to Bob, who performs an experiment,
and takes the outcome as informative about what Alice has done.
In the simplest case, suppose that there are two procedures, which
we will call P1 and P0, and that Bob has available to him an experi-
ment with two possible results, R1 and R0, such that with probability
one he obtains R1 if Alice has performed P1 and R0 if she has per-
formed P0. In such a circumstance, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that Alice’s preparation has an effect on the state of the mediating
system, and that the sets of states that could result from P1 and P0,
respectively, are disjoint. Insisting that all probabilities be regarded as
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subjective judgments, as QBists do,7 does not change the situation.
If Bob’s credences, or subjective degrees of belief, are such that he
assigns probability one to the outcome R1 conditional on the supposi-
tion of P1, and probability one to the outcome R0 conditional on the
supposition of P0, the natural explanation for this is that Bob believes
that Alice’s preparation has an effect on the state of the system that
influences the outcome, and that he believes that the sets of states
that could result from P1 and P0, respectively, are disjoint.
Could this conclusion be avoided? One could postulate that Al-
ice’s preparation has a direct influence on the result of Bob’s future
experiment, an influence unmediated by any influence on the state of
the world between the preparation and the experiment. One could
also stipulate that we are forbidden to theorize about the states of
the mediating system. Moves of this sort would undermine the usual
patterns of reasoning that underlie information theory, which presume
that Bob, by doing an experiment on the system transmitted to him
by Alice, gains information about what Alice did, mediated by the
system that passed between them. One, could, perhaps imagine sit-
uations in which we had strong evidence for the unreliability of such
patterns of reasoning, evidence strong enough to warrant rejecting
them. Perhaps! But it should be noncontroversial that the mere fact
that application of such inference schemes leads to the conclusion that
the world is fundamentally nonclassical, or that it has features that
some find unpalatable, does not constitute evidence for their unrelia-
bility.
It doesn’t change matters much if we stipulate, as QBists do (Fuchs et al.,
2014), that Alice is forbidden to even consider the effects of her choices
of on the probabilities of outcomes of an experiment performed by an-
other agent. To make a stipulation of this sort is to abandon the very
framework of information theory, but it doesn’t block the inference,
as Alice can send messages to her future self, as an aid to memory.
Unless Alice believes that, when she looks tomorrow at the laptop she
typed on today, she will gain information about what she wrote ear-
lier, mediated by the effect on the internal state of the laptop of her
choices made today, then it is hard to understand what she is doing,
or why.
In cases in which the probabilities are different from zero and one,
the reasoning is similar. Suppose that Alice has a choice between two
7See, in particular, Caves et al. (2007).
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coin-flipping procedures: P0, which yields heads and tails with equal
probability, and P1, which yields heads with probability 2/3 and tails
with probability 1/3. Alice chooses a preparation, flips the coin, and
then passes it to Bob, who looks at it and sees heads or tails. He
thereby gains information about the preparation procedure. If his
prior credences in P0 and P1 are Cr(P0) and Cr(P1), respectively,
and if his conditional credences Cr(H|P0), Cr(H|P1), are those just
mentioned, then, in the event of seeing heads, an application of Bayes’
theorem yields the result that his posterior credences in the two prepa-
rations should satisfy,
Cr(P1|H)
Cr(P0|H) =
Cr(H|P1) Cr(P1)
Cr(H|P0) Cr(P0) =
4
3
(
Cr(P1)
Cr(P0)
)
. (1)
That is, his credence in P1 is increased, and his credence in P0 di-
minished, in such a way that their ratio is increased by a factor of
4/3. In the event of seeing tails, his posterior credences in the two
preparations should satisfy,
Cr(P1|T )
Cr(P0|T ) =
Cr(T |P1) Cr(P1)
Cr(T |P0) Cr(P0) =
2
3
(
Cr(P1)
Cr(P0)
)
. (2)
Thus, the result of looking at the coin is, for Bob, informative about
the preparation Alice chose; seeing heads boosts his credence in P1,
and lowers his credence in P0, whereas seeing tails boosts his credence
in P0, and lowers his credence in P1.
In this case, there are two disjoint classes of physical states that
the coin can be in, corresponding to heads and tails. Corresponding to
each preparation are probabilities for the state of the coin ending up in
each of these classes, and it is assumed that Bob can ascertain which of
these classes the state of the coin is in without error, simply by looking.
This latter assumption is inessential. We might assume that Bob has
some blurriness of vision, which introduces error at the readout stage,
and that, in any state of the coin, there is some probability that he will
see it as heads, and some probability that he will see it as tails. This
changes little; as long as the net probability that he will see the coin
as heads is higher given preparation P1 than it is given preparation
P0, seeing heads should boost his credence that the preparation was
P1.
In reasoning of this sort there are two sorts of probabilities to be
taken into account. We have preparation probabilities: we associate
with each preparation procedure a probability distribution over the
12
possible physical states that could result from the preparation. We
also have outcome probabilities: for any experiment that can be per-
formed on the system, for any physical state of the system we have,
for each outcome, a probability of obtaining that outcome given that
physical state.
It is worth noting that nothing at all in this sort of reasoning
depends on whether these preparation and outcome probabilities are
taken to be epistemic, or a matter of physics, or some mixture of
epistemic and physical considerations. Bob might take it that the un-
derlying physics is deterministic and that any uncertainty he might
have about the result of a preparation stems from uncertainty about
the details of what goes on in the preparation; all that matters is that
the choice of preparation matters to his credences about the resulting
state in a way that matters to his credences about the results of his
experiment. If, on the other hand, the preparation and outcome prob-
abilities are regarded as objective chances, then, provided that Bob
knows what objective chance distribution to associate with a given
preparation, and what distribution to associate with outcomes of a
given experiment, and provided that his credences satisfy the Princi-
ple Principal,8 his conditional credences will be such that he takes the
outcomes of the experiment to be informative about the preparation.
Those who wish to construe the probabilities that appear in the the-
orems to be considered below as purely epistemic are welcome to do
so; the conclusion they will arrive at is that an agent whose credences
about experimental outcomes conform to quantum mechanics ought
to regard distinct quantum states as ontologically distinct.
These sorts of considerations, which have been more or less implicit
in much of the discussions concerning the reality of quantum states,
have been explicitly formulated by Harrigan and Spekkens (2010). We
associate with any physical system a physical state space, or ontic
state space Λ, and a set L of subsets of Λ that will be taken to be
the measurable sets, that is, the ones that are candidates for ascribing
a probability to.9 With any preparation procedure ψ is associated
8This is a principal often tacitly assumed in probabilistic reasoning, which was explicitly
identified and named by David Lewis (1980). It requires a meshing between an agent’s
degrees of belief in a proposition A and her degrees of belief in propositions about possible
chances of A. The Principle requires that an agent’s degree of belief in A, conditional on
the supposition that the chance of A is equal to x, be itself equal to x.
9We make the assumption, which is usual in probability theory, that L contains Λ and
is closed under complementation and countable union; that is, we will take L to be a
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a probability distribution Pψ on the measurable space 〈Λ,L〉. For
any experiment E, with a set of outcomes ok, k = 1, . . . , n, there is
a corresponding set of response functions fk, such that fk(λ) is the
probability of obtaining outcome ok in ontic state λ. As these are
probabilities for a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
alternatives, they must add up to one. Thus, for all λ ∈ Λ,
n∑
k=1
fk(λ) = 1. (3)
With these in place, the probability that a system subjected to prepa-
ration ψ yields outcome ok when experiment E is performed on it is
the expectation value of fk with respect to Pψ.
Pψ(ok) =
∫
Λ
fk(λ) dPψ(λ) (4)
A few words of comment about the notion of preparation being
invoked here. Note that we associate with each preparation proce-
dure a corresponding probability distribution on the ontic state space.
These probability distributions differ for different preparations, but it
is assumed that, once the preparation performed has been specified,
everything relevant to probabilities of outcomes of subsequent experi-
ments has been specified. In particular, a preparation screens off such
things as details of the past of the system that are not relevant to
specification of the preparation. One could take this to be part of
the meaning of “preparation”—if you think that the past of a system
continues to be relevant to future events, after a certain procedure has
been performed, then you should take differing pasts to correspond to
different preparations. Local preparations—that is, preparations tak-
ing place in a bounded region of space and time—are taken to screen
off correlations between the prepared systems and the world outside.
The assumption that preparations of this sort are possible, and,
indeed, are routinely performed in laboratories, is a substantive as-
sumption, an assumption that does not follow from anything like a
condition of causal locality. It is neither necessarily true nor knowable
a priori. However, it is an assumption that lies deep at the heart
of virtually all experimental science. If we ever come to a point at
which we have reasons to doubt this sort of assumption, it will not
come about as a result of experiments that presuppose it. And if we
σ-algebra. See standard texts, such as Billingsley (2012).
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were presented with a reason to doubt this sort of assumption, it is
hard to see how this doubt could be sufficiently contained so as not
to undermine all of experimental science. Fortunately, we are not in
such a position, as no-one has offered grounds for doubting it.
Two preparations ψ, φ are said to be distinguishable if and only
if there is an experiment E such that, for each outcome ok of the
experiment, either Pψ(ok) is zero or Pφ(ok) is zero. This means that,
if a system is subjected to one of two preparations, but you don’t
know which, you can become certain of which it was by performing
the experiment, as every outcome precludes one or the other of the
possible preparations. This generalizes to larger sets of preparations:
a finite set of preparations {ψi} is said to be distinguishable if and
only if there is an experiment E such that, for each outcome ok, at
most one of {Pψi(ok)} is nonzero. Following Leifer (2014), we will
say that a finite set of preparations {ψi} is antidistinguishable if and
only if there is an experiment E such that each outcome of E has zero
probability on some preparation in the set. That is, no matter what
the outcome of the experiment E is, it rules out at least one of the
preparations.
Two preparations are said to be ontologically distinct if there is a
measurable subset S of the ontic state space such that Pψ(S) = 1 and
Pφ(S) = 0. It is a straightforward theorem that any distinguishable set
of preparations is pairwise ontologically distinct. The converse might
not hold; a pair of ontologically distinct preparations might not be
distinguishable. This will be the case whenever there are limitations
on what one can learn about the ontic state of a system in a single
experiment.
If a set of preparations {ψi} is antidistinguishable, this entails that
the corresponding probability distributions {Pψi} have null joint over-
lap. That is, there is no subset S of the ontic state space such that
Pψi(S) > 0 for all ψi in the set.
In the coin-flip example, the two preparations, involving differ-
ing nonextremal probabilities for the outcomes heads and tails, are
neither distinguishable nor ontologically distinct. In the absence of
limitations on available experiments, on a classical theory, any pair of
ontologically distinct states will be distinguishable. What I mean by
this is: if, for every measurable subset S of the state space, there is
an experiment that determines whether or not the state is in S, then
every pair of ontologically distinct states is distinguishable.
In quantum mechanics, as is well-known, nonorthogonal states are
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not distinguishable. If a pure quantum state is part of the ontology,
then preparations of distinct pure states will be ontologically distinct,
and so there will be ontologically distinct preparations that are not
distinguishable.
The question arises whether nonorthogonal quantum states are
analogous to classical states, in which indistinguishability of prepara-
tions corresponds to overlap in the associated probability distribution
on the ontic state space. If this is the case, then one and the same
ontic state is compatible with distinct quantum states, which is to say:
the ontic state does not uniquely determine the quantum state. If, on
the other hand, the quantum state supervenes on the ontic state, then
preparations corresponding to distinct pure quantum states will be
ontologically distinct. If an ontological model of quantum state prepa-
rations and experiments is such that, for any two distinct quantum
states |ψ〉, |φ〉, any pair of preparations ψ, φ that prepare those states
are ontologically distinct, the model is said to be ψ-ontic. Harrigan
and Spekkens (2010) define ψ-epistemic as the negation of ψ-ontic.
In their terminology, therefore, a model is ψ-epistemic if there is even
one pair of distinct quantum states that are not ontologically distinct.
A stronger notion is that of a pairwise ψ-epistemic model, in which
no pair of nonorthogonal pure states is ontologically distinct.
The terminology “ψ-ontic” is apt. If preparations corresponding
to two quantum states |ψ〉, |φ〉 are always ontologically distinct, this
means that the ontic state always reflects which of these states was
prepared. To be physically real, it is not required that quantum states
be part of the fundamental ontology of the theory; states that super-
vene on the fundamental ontology are no less real for not being funda-
mental. An analogy: suppose that I specify some lighting and viewing
conditions, and consider the set of things that, under those conditions,
look yellow to me, and the set of things that, under those conditions,
look blue to me. These sets are, presumably, ontologically distinct.
The two sets would not be simply describable in physical terms, and it
would be difficult to explain to anyone why physical things are being
lumped together in these ways without reference to the visual system
of creatures like me. But they are ontologically distinct nonetheless,
and the distinction reflects a distinction in reality.
On the other hand, taking “ψ-epistemic” to be simply the nega-
tion of “ψ-ontic” seems to me to be potentially misleading. Consider,
for example, a classical system, whose ontic state is represented by
a point in its phase space. Suppose that one could learn either its
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position, or its momentum, but not both, though it always has de-
terminate position and momentum. Any position is compatible with
any momentum, and hence, for any position x and momentum p, the
set of ontic states corresponding to position x overlaps with the set of
states corresponding to momentum p. That doesn’t mean that there
is anything epistemic about position or momentum.
In addition, to call a model “ψ-epistemic” if there are distinct
quantum states whose associated probability distributions have some
overlap, no matter how small, is potentially misleading, as it might
suggest that the goal of constructing an interpretation on which quan-
tum states are like classical probability distributions has been achieved.
This, however, would require that the model be what has been called a
maximally ψ-epistemic model (Barrett et al., 2014). On such a model,
the indistinguishability of quantum states is fully explained by overlap
of the corresponding probability distributions on ontic state space.
In addition to preparations that are perfectly distinguishable, there
are also preparations that come close. A coin-flipping procedure that
yields heads with probability very close to unity is distinguishable, not
with complete certainty, but with high probability, from a coin-flipping
procedure that yields tails with probability close to unity. For one way
to quantify this, imagine the following game. A system is subjected
to one of a pair of preparations, ψ, φ, with equal probability. You are
presented with the prepared system, and are allowed to perform any
experiment that you like. On the basis of the outcome of the experi-
ment, you make a guess as to which preparation was performed. We
ask: if you choose your experiment wisely, how high can the probabil-
ity of your making a correct guess be? In the best case, there is an
experiment that is certain to yield differing results depending on which
preparation was applied, and the probability of correctly identifying
the preparation is unity. In the worst case, any outcome of any exper-
iment you can do has the same probability on both preparations, and
the probability of correctly identifying the preparation is no greater
than one-half. In general, the probability of correctly identifying the
preparation, on an optimal strategy, is
P (correct guess) =
1
2
(1 + sup |Pψ(o)− Pφ(o)|) . (5)
Here “sup” means supremum, that, is, the maximum value, taken over
all outcomes o of experiments that can be performed on the system
in question, or if there is no maximum value but only an increasing
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sequence of values that approaches some limiting value, this limiting
value. We define the distinguishability of the preparations as
d(ψ, φ) = sup |Pψ(o)− Pφ(o)| , (6)
The distinguishability d(ψ, φ) ranges between 0, for the case in which
ψ and φ are indistinguishable, and 1, for perfectly distinguishable
preparations. If the preparations correspond to quantum states |ψ〉,
|φ〉, then, if there are no restrictions on the permitted experiments
(that is, if every experiment that, according to quantum mechanics,
is possible, is permitted), we have
d(ψ, φ) =
√
1− |〈φ|ψ〉|2. (7)
We will want also a notion of approximate ontological distinctness.
Given two probability distributions P,Q on a measurable space 〈Λ,L〉,
we define the statistical distance, also known as the total variation
distance, between P and Q as
δ(P,Q) = sup
A∈L
|P (A)−Q(A)| . (8)
Its value ranges between 0, when P = Q, and 1, when P and Q have
disjoint supports. We define the classical overlap of two probability
distributions by
ω(P,Q) = 1− δ(P,Q). (9)
Clearly, for any preparations ψ, φ, we will always have
d(ψ, φ) ≤ δ(Pψ , Pφ). (10)
That is, distinguishability of two preparations can never be greater
than their ontological distinctness. In the classical case, if there are
no restrictions on experiments—that is, if, for any measurable subset
S of the state space, there is an experiment that determines whether
or not the state is in S—then we have equality in (10). In this case,
all indistinguishability of two preparations is accounted for by overlap
between the corresponding state-space probability distributions. Fol-
lowing Barrett et al. (2014), we will say that an ontological model of
some fragment of quantum mechanics is maximally ψ-epistemic if and
only if, for every pair of states |ψ〉, |φ〉,
d(ψ, φ) =
√
1− |〈φ|ψ〉|2 = δ(Pψ , Pφ), (11)
or, equivalently,
ω(Pψ, Pφ) = 1−
√
1− |〈φ|ψ〉|2. (12)
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3.2 The BCLM Theorem
Following Barrett, Calvalcanti, Lal, and Maroney (2014) (BCLM), we
define the quantum overlap of two pure quantum states |ψ〉, |φ〉 as
ωQ(|ψ〉, |φ〉) = 1− d(ψ, φ) = 1−
√
1− |〈φ|ψ〉|2. (13)
This is zero for orthogonal states (〈φ|ψ〉 = 0), and unity when |ψ〉 =
|φ〉. If one had a theory on which quantum states were like classical
probability distributions, and indistinguishability of quantum states
could be fully accounted for by overlap of the corresponding distri-
butions on an ontic state space—that is, a maximally ψ-epistemic
theory—one would have, for all preparations ψ, φ that prepare pure
quantum states |ψ〉, |φ〉,
ω(Pφ, Pψ) = ωQ(|ψ〉, |φ〉). (14)
This can be achieved for some fragments of quantum theory, which
is what gives impetus to the project of attempting to construct a
comprehensive theory of this sort that accounts for all quantum phe-
nomena. However, as Barrett et al. (2014) demonstrate, it cannot be
achieved for a model that fully reproduces quantum mechanics on a
Hilbert space of dimension greater than three.
Here, in a nutshell, is the argument. Consider a Hilbert space Hd
of a dimension d = pn, greater than 3, that is a power of some prime
number p. BCLM show that, for any |φ〉 ∈ Hd, one can construct
a set of state vectors, Ψ = {|ψi〉, i = 1, . . . , d2} with the following
properties.
a) For all |ψi〉 ∈ Ψ, |〈φ|ψi〉| = 1/
√
d.
b) For any pair |ψi〉, |ψj〉 of distinct elements of Ψ, either
i) |ψi〉 and |ψj〉 are orthogonal to each other, and hence the
corresponding preparation distributions have null overlap,
or
ii) the triple {|φ〉, |ψi〉, |ψj〉} is an antidistinguishable set, and
hence the corresponding preparation distributions have null
joint overlap.
On either of the alternatives, there is no joint overlap of {Pφ, Pψi , Pψj}.
Now consider the average value of the overlap ω(Pφ, Pψi), averaged
over all elements of the set Ψ. Call this ω¯(Pφ,Ψ).
ω¯(Pφ,Ψ) =
1
d2
d2∑
i=1
ω(Pφ, Pψi). (15)
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From the fact that no pair of distinct elements Pψi , Pψj of Ψ have
non-null joint overlap with Pφ, it follows that
d2∑
i=1
ω(Pφ, Pψi) ≤ 1, (16)
and hence that
ω¯(Pφ,Ψ) ≤ 1
d2
. (17)
Since, for each |ψi〉 in Ψ, |〈φ|ψi〉| = 1/
√
d, the value of the quantum
overlap with φ is the same for each.
ωQ(|φ〉, |ψi〉) = 1−
√
1− 1/d. (18)
Call this value of the quantum overlap with |φ〉, which is the same for
all members of Ψ, ωQ(|φ〉,Ψ). From (17), with a little bit of arithmetic,
we get
ω¯(Pφ,Ψ) ≤ 1
d
(
1 +
√
1− 1/d
)
ωQ(|φ〉,Ψ) < 2
d
ωQ(|φ〉,Ψ). (19)
So, for example, for the case d = 4, the lowest-dimensional Hilbert
space to which this theorem applies, for any vector |φ〉 there is a set
Ψ of 16 vectors such that the average overlap of Pφ with distributions
corresponding to elements of Ψ satisfies
ω¯(Pφ,Ψ) ≤ 1
4
(1−
√
3/2) ωQ(|φ〉,Ψ) ≈ 0.47 ωQ(|φ〉,Ψ). (20)
Now, the average of the overlap ω(Pφ, Pψi) taken over the set Ψ cannot
be less than the smallest value of this overlap for |ψi〉 in that set.
Therefore, there must be at least one |ψi〉 in Ψ such that
ω(Pφ, Pψi) <
2
d
ωQ(|φ〉, |ψi〉). (21)
No ontological model for quantum mechanics can come close to the
dream of having quantum states be like classical probability distribu-
tions. Even in a 4-dimensional Hilbert space, any ontological model
must have, for some |φ〉, |ψ〉, an overlap between the corresponding
probability distributions that is less than half of the quantum overlap
between these states. For larger Hilbert spaces, the minimum value of
the ratio of classical overlap ω to quantum overlap ωQ must be even
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smaller, and, for an ontological model of quantum mechanics on an
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, this ratio can have no minimum
value greater than zero. This completely dashes the hope that pro-
vides much of the impetus for the project of constructing a theory on
which quantum states are not ontic.
3.3 The PBR Theorem
The BCLM theorem applies to any ontological model of quantum me-
chanics, and shows that no such model can be fully ψ-epistemic. There
can be no theorem of this sort, which places no conditions on the onto-
logical model, that has the conclusion that distinct quantum states are
always ontologically distinct, as it is possible to construct ontological
models in which any pair of distinct quantum states have some over-
lap in their corresponding probability distributions (Aaronson et al.,
2013). A ψ-ontology theorem, therefore, must make some assump-
tions about the ontological model. These assumptions should not be
arbitrary, but should be physically well-motivated. In this section we
consider the theorem of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (2012) (PBR),
which imposes an independence condition on probability distributions
corresponding to product states.
Consider a pair of systems, A, B, each of which is to subjected to
one of two distinct quantum state preparations, |ψ〉, |φ〉, with |〈ψ|φ〉| ≤
1/
√
2. Consider now the set of states
{|ψ〉A|ψ〉B , |ψ〉A|φ〉B , |φ〉A|ψ〉B , |φ〉A|φ〉B}.
It can be shown that this set of states is antidistinguishable (Moseley,
2013). That is, there is an experiment E such that each outcome
of the experiment is precluded by one of these preparations. This
entails that there is no four-way joint overlap between the probability
distributions on ontic state space corresponding to these four states.
Now suppose we add a further postulate, the Preparation Inde-
pendence Postulate (PIP). This is actually the conjunction of two
postulates. The first postulate, which, following Leifer, we call the
Cartesian Product Assumption (CPA), is the condition that, when
a pair of systems are independently subjected to pure-state prepara-
tions, the set of ontic states that can result from the preparation can
be represented as a subset of the Cartesian product of state spaces of
the individual systems. That is, the ontic state λ can be represented
as an ordered pair 〈λA, λB〉, where λA represents the ontic state of
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A and λB represents the ontic state of B. The second postulate, the
No Correlations Assumption, is the condition that, for appropriate
preparations, the probability distributions corresponding to the four
joint preparations are simply products of local distributions. That is,
there are probability distributions PAψ , P
A
φ on the state space of A, and
probability distributions PBψ , P
B
φ on the state space of B, such that,
for any measurable subsets ∆A of A’s state space and ∆B of B’s state
space, the probability, on the joint distribution Pψ,ψ corresponding to
|ψ〉A|ψ〉B , that λA is in ∆A and λB is in ∆B, is simply the product of
PAψ (∆A) and P
B
ψ (∆B), and the probability, on the joint distribution
Pψ,φ corresponding to |ψ〉A|φ〉B , that λA is in ∆A and λB is in ∆B , is
the product of PAψ (∆A) and P
B
φ (∆B), and so on, for the other possible
preparations.
The NCA can itself be regarded as a conjunction of two assump-
tions. The first, which we will call Ontic Parameter Independence, is
that, for a given choice of preparation on A, the marginal distribu-
tion of λA—that is, the distribution obtained from the joint distri-
bution over 〈λA, λB〉 obtained by averaging over λB—is the same for
each choice of preparation on B. The second is the condition that,
for any choice of preparations on the two systems, the corresponding
probability distribution is one on which λA and λB are independently
distributed. This assumption may well be called the No Correlations
Assumption, but, since that label is already in use, we will call it the
Independence Assumption.
The Ontic Parameter Independence assumption is a causal locality
assumption, and is required for compatibility with relativistic causal-
ity. If it is violated, a choice of preparation on one system influences
the probability of the result of the other preparation, even if we do
not have the epistemic access to the ontic state of the system required
to exploit this for signalling. The Independence Assumption is not
required by causal locality, as there may be correlations between the
states of the two systems that are due to influences in their common
past. The assumption really amounts to the assumption that there is
some way to effect the preparations so that such correlations are ef-
fectively screened off. It is not required that every procedure that we
would regard as preparing the requisite quantum product state effect
this screening off, only that there be some way to do this. Though
this is not required by any sort of condition of causal locality, it is the
sort of assumption that is pervasive in experimental science.
With the PIP in place, the condition that there be no four-way
22
overlap between the four distributions considered entails ontological
distinctness of Pψ and Pφ on the state spaces of the subsystems A
and B. To see this, assume the contrary: suppose there is a subset
∆A ⊆ ΛA that is assigned nonzero probability by both PAψ and PAφ ,
and that there is a subset ∆B ⊆ ΛB that is assigned nonzero proba-
bility by both PBψ and P
B
φ . Then, if the joint probability distributions
satisfy the PIP, the set ∆A × ∆B, which consists of pairs 〈λA, λB〉,
with λA ∈ ∆A and λB ∈ ∆B , is assigned nonzero probability by all
four preparations, which is incompatible with the antidistinguishabil-
ity of the set of preparations. We therefore, conclude that either PAψ
and PAφ are ontologically distinct, or P
B
ψ and P
B
φ are. However, if
these are systems of the same type, subjected to the same choices of
preparations, it seems reasonable to assume that the probability dis-
tributions are unchanged under an exchange of A and B, from which
it follows that PAψ is ontologically distinct from P
A
φ , and P
B
ψ , from
PAφ .
This argument applies to any pair of states with |ψ〉, |φ〉, with
|〈ψ|φ〉| ≤ 1/√2. For a pair of distinct states with a larger quantum
overlap (that is, with |〈ψ|φ〉| > 1/√2), we consider a larger set of
systems of the same type. Consider a system consisting of 2n sub-
systems. Divide them into two equal subsets, which we will call A
and B. Our choice of preparations consists of a choice between sub-
jecting all of the systems in A to the |ψ〉-preparation, or subjecting
all of them to the |φ〉-preparation. We make the same choice for B.
Since |ψ〉 and φ are distinct, |〈ψ|φ〉| < 1, and, for sufficiently large
n, the n-fold product state |ψ〉1 . . . |ψ〉n has sufficiently small overlap
with the n-fold product |φ〉1 . . . |φ〉n for the theorem to apply. With
the PIP in place, we conclude ontological distinctness of these n-fold
product states, and, using the PIP again, of the states |ψ〉i, |φ〉i of the
individual subsystems.
The result is robust under elimination of the idealization of perfect
preclusion, as it must be, to be taken seriously as telling us something
about the actual world. Suppose that there exists an experiment such
that, for some small ε, for each outcome, there is a preparation that
ascribes a probability less than ε to that outcome. On the assumption
of the PIP, it follows that the overlap ω(Pφ, Pψ) between probability
distributions corresponding to the two preparations is less than 2
√
ε.
See the Supplementary Information section of Pusey et al. (2012) for
details of the proof.
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4 Doing Without the Cartesian Prod-
uct Assumption
4.1 The Preparation Uninformativeness Con-
dition
We have so far not discussed the status of the CPA. It is, in fact,
violated in relativistic quantum field theories as we now have them.
Suppose that Alice and Bob perform operations on two systems A and
B, these operations taking place within bounded spacetime regions,
at spacelike separation from each other. We assume that the effects
of Alice and Bob’s operations on the quantum state can be repre-
sented by operators operating on the quantum state, and adopt the
usual assumptions, required to ensure compatibility with relativistic
causality, that the operators representing Alice’s operations commute
with operators representing observables at spacelike separation from
her operations, and with those representing Bob’s. On these assump-
tions, in the context of quantum field theory, we cannot assume that
there is an operation that can be counted on to completely remove
all entanglement between the systems A and B, and prepare them
in a state that is exactly a product state.10 A product state can be
approximated as closely as we like, but cannot be reliably achieved
exactly. In light of this, we need an independence postulate that does
not presume that it is possible to prepare product states. It is best
not to make any assumption about the structure of the state space at
all, as we cannot expect to anticipate what sorts of state descriptions
future theories might bring.
The assumption we will adopt in place of the PIP is one that we
will call the Preparation Uninformative Condition (PUC). The PUC
is meant to capture as much as we can of the content of the assump-
tion that local state-preparations are possible without presupposing
anything at all about the structure of the state spaces of composite
systems. To state the assumption, we consider the following set-up.
Suppose that, for systems A, B, we have some set of possible prepa-
rations of the individual systems. Suppose that the choice of prepara-
tion for each of the subsystems is made independently. Following the
preparation of the joint system, which consists of individual prepa-
rations on the subsystems, you are not told which preparations have
10See Clifton and Halvorson (2001) for further discussion.
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been performed, but you are given a specification of the ontic state of
the joint system. On the basis of this information, you form credences
about which preparations were performed. In the case of ontically
distinct preparations, you will be certain about what preparation has
been performed; if the preparations are not ontically distinct, you
may have less than total information about which preparations were
performed.
We ask: under these conditions, if you are now given information
about which preparation was performed on one system, is this infor-
mative about which preparation was performed on the other? The
Preparation Uninformative Condition is the assumption that it is not.
This condition is satisfied in any model that satisfies the PIP. It is
also satisfied whenever the preparations are ontically distinct. In such
a case, given the ontic state of the joint system, you know precisely
which preparations have been performed, and being told about the
preparation on one system does not add to your stock of knowledge.
One way in which the PUC can be violated is to have the ontic
state space of the joint system to be the Cartesian product of the
subsystem ontic spaces, and for the joint probability distributions to
be ones in which the states of the subsystems are correlated. It is
also violated, as we shall see, by models, such as those constructed by
Aaronson et al. (2013), on which nonorthogonal quantum states are
never ontically distinct.
The PUC is implied by the PIP, but it is strictly weaker. Even if
the CPA is assumed, it is possible to construct models for the PBR
setup, outlined in the previous section, in which the PUC is satisfied
but Pψ,ψ and Pψ,φ have nonzero overlap, which by the PBR theorem,
is ruled out for models that satisfy the NCA. See Myrvold (2018) for
one such construction.
The PUC, it seems to me, is a necessary condition for the oper-
ations considered to count as local state-preparations. The substan-
tive physical assumption made is that it is that such preparations are
achievable, with sufficient effort, or, failing that, that it is possible
to achieve approximate satisfaction of the condition, to as high a de-
gree of approximation as is desired. This is all that is needed for the
conclusions we will be drawing. It is not assumed that arbitrary oper-
ations satisfy the condition; only those that are to be counted as local
state-preparations.
It should be emphasized that the PUC is not a causal locality con-
dition; there are operations that violate it without violating causal lo-
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cality. To see this, consider the following example, from quantum me-
chanics. Consider two systems, A, B, with associated Hilbert spaces
HA and HB. Take a pair of orthogonal state vectors |0〉, |1〉 from each
Hilbert space, and form an entangled state vector,
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B) . (22)
Alice and Bob will each choose between two operations, and perform
them, after which you will be told the resulting quantum state (as-
sumed ontic for the purpose of this example). Suppose that Alice
and Bob each have the choice between doing nothing, or performing a
bit-flip operation that interchanges |0〉 and |1〉. You are told that the
resulting state is just |Φ+〉, the same state that they started with. You
are undecided between two alternatives: either Alice and Bob both did
nothing, or they both did a bit flip. Clearly, in this situation, given
the ontic state, information about Alice’s choice of operation tells you
something about Bob’s. But this is a symptom of the fact that this
is not a situation that counts as a pair of local state-preparations.
The systems start out in an entangled state, and remain entangled.
If, on the other hand, Alice and Bob’s choices are between operations
guaranteed to disentangle the systems, then, given the resulting quan-
tum state, which would be a product state, information about Alice’s
choice of operation would tell you nothing about Bob’s. Operations of
that sort are candidates for being regarded as local state-preparations.
4.2 A ψ-Ontology result without the CPA
We consider a set-up consisting of two subsystems A,B, with a choice
of preparations ψ, φ to be made on each. Suppose that the set of
four states arising from the two choices of preparation on the two sub-
systems is antidistinguishable. It follows from this that there is no
joint overlap between the probability distributions corresponding to
the four preparations. If, now, we impose the Preparation Uninforma-
tiveness Condition, it follows that, given the ontic state of the joint
system, you will be undecided about at most one of the preparations
performed on the subsystems. That is, either the ontic state allows
you to uniquely determine the preparation of A, or it allows you to
uniquely determine the preparation of B. This means that Pψ,ψ and
Pφ,φ have null overlap, as do Pψ,φ and Pφ,ψ.
To see this, suppose the contrary. Suppose that, given the ontic
state λ, you are undecided about the preparations of both subsystems.
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This indecision can obtain only when λ is either in a joint overlap of
Pψ,ψ and Pφ,φ, or in a joint overlap of Pψ,φ and Pφ,ψ. Suppose it
is the former. Then, since there is no four-way overlap between the
four preparation distributions, the ontic state must be incompatible
with at least one of the other two preparations. Suppose that it is
incompatible with 〈ψ, φ〉. Then you are undecided between the prepa-
rations 〈ψ,ψ〉 and 〈φ, φ〉, but have zero credence in 〈ψ, φ〉. Suppose,
now, you are told that the A-preparation was ψ, and you update your
credences on that information. You have now become certain that the
B-preparation was ψ, in violation of the PUC. Similarly, if the ontic
state λ is incompatible with 〈φ,ψ〉, being told that the A-preparation
was φ is informative about the B-preparation, in violation of the PUC.
The same reasoning holds, of course, for an overlap of Pψ,φ and Pφ,ψ.
Therefore, from antidistinguishability of the four preparations and the
PUC it follows that the ontic state λ must uniquely determine either
the quantum state of A or the quantum state of B.
This result is robust under de-idealization. If, for some small ε,
there is a 4-outcome experiment E such that each preparation accords
probability less than ε to some outcome of E, then, on the assumption
of the PUC, Pψ,ψ and Pφ,φ have small overlap, as do Pψ,φ and Pφ,ψ:
ω(Pψ,ψ, Pφ,φ) ≤ 4
√
ε;
ω(Pψ,φ, Pφ,ψ) ≤ 4
√
ε.
(23)
See Myrvold (2018) for details.
Now consider a large numberN of systems, each subject to a choice
of ψ or φ preparations. Call this large system, consisting of N subsys-
tems, ΣN . Among the experiments that can be performed on Σ are,
for each pair of subsystems 〈i, j〉, an experiment that antidistinguishes
the four alternatives {〈ψi, ψj〉, 〈φi, ψj〉, 〈ψi, φj〉, 〈φi, φj〉} for those sub-
systems. We require of our theory that it reproduce the quantum
probabilities for any experiment that might be performed on the sys-
tem. Then, on the assumption of the PUC, this entails that the ontic
state of ΣN must be such that, for each pair of subsystems, this ontic
state uniquely determines the quantum state of at least one of them.
It follows from this that the ontic state of ΣN must uniquely determine
the quantum state of at least N − 1 of the subsystems. Therefore, in
a large array of systems of this sort, the ontic state of the whole must
uniquely determine the quantum state of the vast majority of them,
with at most one exception. By taking N large enough, we can make
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the probability that a randomly chosen subsystem has its quantum
state uniquely determined by the ontic state of ΣN as close to unity
as we like.
Let us now impose a Principle of Extendibility. This is the re-
quirement that the ontic state of the system ΣN be compatible with
regarding the system as a subsystem of a larger system ΣN ′ consisting
of N ′ subsystems subjected to ψ or φ preparations, for arbitrarily large
N ′. With this assumed, the probability that all of ΣN ’s subsystems
have their preparations uniquely determined by the ontic state of ΣN
must be greater than p for all p < 1. That is, with probability one,
all of the subsystems of ΣN must be such that their quantum states
are uniquely determined by the ontic state of ΣN .
This result is, again, robust under relaxation of the assumption of
perfect antidistinguishability. It can be shown that, if, for each pair
of subsystems, there is an experiment such that each of the outcomes
has probability less than ε, then the ontic state of ΣN must be such
that it permits almost certain identification of the quantum state of
a randomly selected subsystem. Once again, see Myrvold (2018) for
details.
This result holds for pure-state preparations |ψ〉, |φ〉, with |〈ψ|φ〉| ≤
1/
√
2, and, because it is robust under approximations, for any pair of
preparations that approximate such states closely enough to permit
approximate antidistinguishability. For quantum states with a greater
quantum overlap, we can use the result to show that for sufficiently
large n, the n-fold product |ψ〉1 . . . |ψ〉n is ontologically distinct from
|φ〉1 . . . |φ〉n. Unlike the PIP, the PUC does not permit us to con-
clude, straightaway, that for individual subsystems |ψ〉 is ontologi-
cally distinct from |φ〉. But it is hard to believe that there is a theory
worth taking seriously which is such that |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are ontologically
distinct whenever |〈ψ|φ〉| ≤ 1/√2 and, though |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are not
ontologically distinct for individual systems, for a sufficiently large
collection of systems the set of states that can arise from subject-
ing all of them to the |ψ〉-preparation is ontologically distinct from
the set of states that care arise from subjecting all of them to the
|φ〉-preparation. To echo Bell (1977), if someone presents me with a
candidate for such a theory, I will not refuse to listen, but I will not
myself try to make such a theory.
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5 Conclusion
The PUC is a fairly weak condition, consistent with pervasive nonsep-
arability of state descriptions, and satisfied even in manifestly nonlocal
theories of quantum phenomena, such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory.
Though, of course, it is possible to consider theories on which it does
not hold, it must be admitted that we have no evidence whatsoever
that this condition is not satisfied in the actual world. Any theory
that satisfies this condition must have it that distinct states with an
inner product not greater than 1/
√
2 are ontologically distinct. Fur-
thermore, no theory whatsoever, whether it satisfies the PUC or not,
can both reproduce the quantum probabilities for results of experi-
ments and satisfy the desideratum that indistinguishability of states
be fully accounted for by overlap of the corresponding probability dis-
tributions. For these reasons, though the project of constructing a
theory, of the sort envisaged by Einstein, in which quantum states are
analogous to probability distributions in classical statistical mechan-
ics, was well-motivated, we have to admit that the fruit it has borne
consists of insight into why the goal cannot be achieved.
We have reached the point, it seems to me, at which anyone con-
cerned with understanding what the empirical success of quantum the-
ory is telling us about the world should acknowledge that it is telling
us that the furniture of the world includes something corresponding
to quantum states. This, of course, does not come close to settling
the question of what a complete account of the world might be like,
and the old questions remain about how best to understand what it
is that quantum theory is telling us about the world we live in.
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